Papers
"Ideology Critique and Game Theory," Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
Ideology critics believe that many bad social practices persist because of ideology, and that critiquing ideology is an effective way to promote social reform. Skeptics draw on game theory to argue that the persistence of such practices is better explained by collective action problems, and that ideology critique is causally inefficacious. I reconcile these two camps.
"Moral Uncertainty and Public Justification" (with Andreas T Schmidt), Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming).
Moral uncertainty theorists ask what individuals should do given moral uncertainty. Public reason liberals ask what societies should do given moral disagreement. The latter defend public justification: state action should be justified to all reasonable people. We bring these approaches together, arguing that moral uncertainty supports a weighty but not overriding concern with public justification.
"Longtermist Political Philosophy: An Agenda for Future Research" (with Andreas T Schmidt), in H. Greaves, D. Thorstad, and J. Barrett (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
We set out longtermist political philosophy as a research field. First, we motivate "institutional longtermism": when evaluating institutions, we should give significant weight to their very long-term effects. Then, we examine points of tension and convergence between longtermism and five central values in political philosophy: justice, equality, freedom, legitimacy, and democracy.
"Deviating from the Ideal," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
Ideal theorists aim to describe the ideally just society. Problem solvers aim to work out how to make actual societies more just. The benchmark view says that ideal theory has priority, because the ideal serves as an indispensable benchmark for evaluating societies in terms of how far they deviate from it. I disagree. Ideal theory is not required for, and is of only limited relevance to, problem solving.
"Ethical Veganism and Free Riding" (with Sarah Raskoff), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (2023): 184-212.
Many argue that we should go vegan to reduce animal suffering. But this argument faces a challenge: individual vegans are unlikely to make a difference. So we develop an alternative argument for ethical veganism—or, at least, for reducing your consumption of inhumanely raised animal products—grounded in the wrong of free riding on the collective reduction of animal suffering.
"Social Experimentation in an Unjust World" (with Allen Buchanan), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 9 (2023): 127-152.
We defend progressive experimentalism: the view that social experimentation promotes social progress, including progress in justice. We then argue that background injustice undermines social experimentation's ability to play this role. One upshot is that, to render social experimentation a more reliable engine for long-run social progress of any sort, we must mitigate existing injustices.
"Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being," Utilitas 34, no. 1 (2022): 97-104. (reply)
In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being can avoid the problem of interpersonal comparisons by turning from a preference- to a desire-satisfaction theory. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but raise new objections to the desire-satisfaction theory. I reply that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids these objections and has some further virtues.
"Optimism about Moral Responsibility," Philosophers' Imprint 20, no. 33 (2020): 1-17.
Optimists about moral responsibility believe that our moral responsibility practices are justified by their beneficial consequences. Although historically prominent versions of optimism face serious challenges, I argue that the position, suitably modified, provides both a plausible justification of our practices and a fruitful framework for evaluating potential reforms.
"Punishment and Disagreement in the State of Nature," Economics and Philosophy 36, no. 3 (2020): 334-354.
I analyze Hobbes's and Locke's states of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.
"Efficient Inequalities," Journal of Political Philosophy 28, no. 2 (2020): 181-198.
Scanlon has recently argued that inequalities are unjust unless they are efficient in a way that benefits everyone. I show that this view is inconsistent given only a few very weak assumptions. If inequalities are justified when they benefit everyone, then they may also be justified by their production of a sufficient number of total benefits—regardless of how these benefits are distributed.
"Social Reform in a Complex World," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2020): 103-132.
There are two major approaches to theorizing about social reform: problem solving and ideal theory. Drawing on considerations of social complexity, I argue that the former is unsatisfactory and the latter infeasible. I then defend a new sort of theorizing that focuses on how to make institutions more "progressive": better at getting better, or more conducive to further improvements in general.
“Is Maximin Egalitarian?” Synthese 197, no. 2 (2020): 818-837.
According to the Maximin criterion of justice, one society is more just than another if the worst off member in the first society is better off than the worst off member in the second. Maximin is often interpreted as a highly egalitarian criterion that balances a concern with equality against a concern with efficiency. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken: Maximin is not an egalitarian view.
“Laws, Norms, and Public Justification: The Limits of Law as an Instrument of Reform” (with Gerald Gaus), in S. A. Langvatn, M. Kumm, & W. Sadurski (Eds.), Public Reason and Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), 201-228.
We argue that laws are only effective at regulating behavior when they cohere with social norms, and that social norms are only stable when they align with personal moral convictions. And we employ this position to respond to a prominent objection to public reason liberalism—namely, that a commitment to the public justification of law hamstrings the pursuit of social reform.
“Interpersonal Comparisons with Preferences and Desires,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 18, no. 3 (2019): 219-241.
Many argue that interpersonal comparisons of welfare are either conceptually incoherent or hopelessly subjective, at least if one adopts the popular view that an individual's welfare consists in the satisfaction of her preferences. I agree, but argue that such comparisons are much less problematic if welfare is understood in terms of desire- rather than preference- satisfaction.
Edited Volume
Essays on Longtermism (with Hilary Greaves and David Thorstad), under contract with Oxford University Press.
A collection of essays on "longtermism": the view that positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority.
Book Reviews
Ben Laurence, Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice, Ethics (forthcoming).
A summary and review questioning Laurence's defense of the practical relevance of ideal theory.
David Estlund, Utopophobia: On The Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, Mind 131, no. 522 (2022): 691-700.
A summary and review questioning Estlund's defense of the "great value" of ideal theory.
Kevin Vallier, Must Politics be War? Restoring our Trust in the Open Society, Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 5 (2020): 567-570.
A summary and review questioning Vallier's attempt to ground public reason liberalism in the value of social trust.
Dissertation
Social Ideals and Social Reform: Political Philosophy for a Progressive Society
Committee: Gerald Gaus (Chair), Allen Buchanan, Thomas Christiano, Connie Rosati, David Schmidtz
What, if anything, does our conception of the ideally just society tell us about how we should improve our own? I argue, against most ideal theorists, that it tells us hardly anything: it provides us neither with a benchmark for evaluating nonideal societies nor with a long-term target for reform. But if the ideal can’t guide us, then should political philosophers instead engage in problem solving—identifying present instances of injustice, diagnosing their causes, and prescribing targeted solutions—as some self-described nonideal theorists have recently suggested? While problem solving has its place, I argue that it is not enough: problem solving is a good way to identify short-term improvements but not long-term ones. So how, then, should we theorize about long-term reform? I argue that we must supplement problem solving with an attempt to work out how to make our society more progressive: better at getting better, or more conducive to further improvements in general though not necessarily to the achievement of any antecedently specified goal. I offer an account of progressiveness emphasizing experimentation, learning (epistemic feedback), and selection (practical feedback). And I begin to explore some concrete ways of improving the progressiveness of existing societies.
"Ideology Critique and Game Theory," Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
Ideology critics believe that many bad social practices persist because of ideology, and that critiquing ideology is an effective way to promote social reform. Skeptics draw on game theory to argue that the persistence of such practices is better explained by collective action problems, and that ideology critique is causally inefficacious. I reconcile these two camps.
"Moral Uncertainty and Public Justification" (with Andreas T Schmidt), Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming).
Moral uncertainty theorists ask what individuals should do given moral uncertainty. Public reason liberals ask what societies should do given moral disagreement. The latter defend public justification: state action should be justified to all reasonable people. We bring these approaches together, arguing that moral uncertainty supports a weighty but not overriding concern with public justification.
"Longtermist Political Philosophy: An Agenda for Future Research" (with Andreas T Schmidt), in H. Greaves, D. Thorstad, and J. Barrett (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
We set out longtermist political philosophy as a research field. First, we motivate "institutional longtermism": when evaluating institutions, we should give significant weight to their very long-term effects. Then, we examine points of tension and convergence between longtermism and five central values in political philosophy: justice, equality, freedom, legitimacy, and democracy.
"Deviating from the Ideal," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
Ideal theorists aim to describe the ideally just society. Problem solvers aim to work out how to make actual societies more just. The benchmark view says that ideal theory has priority, because the ideal serves as an indispensable benchmark for evaluating societies in terms of how far they deviate from it. I disagree. Ideal theory is not required for, and is of only limited relevance to, problem solving.
"Ethical Veganism and Free Riding" (with Sarah Raskoff), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (2023): 184-212.
Many argue that we should go vegan to reduce animal suffering. But this argument faces a challenge: individual vegans are unlikely to make a difference. So we develop an alternative argument for ethical veganism—or, at least, for reducing your consumption of inhumanely raised animal products—grounded in the wrong of free riding on the collective reduction of animal suffering.
"Social Experimentation in an Unjust World" (with Allen Buchanan), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 9 (2023): 127-152.
We defend progressive experimentalism: the view that social experimentation promotes social progress, including progress in justice. We then argue that background injustice undermines social experimentation's ability to play this role. One upshot is that, to render social experimentation a more reliable engine for long-run social progress of any sort, we must mitigate existing injustices.
"Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being," Utilitas 34, no. 1 (2022): 97-104. (reply)
In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being can avoid the problem of interpersonal comparisons by turning from a preference- to a desire-satisfaction theory. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but raise new objections to the desire-satisfaction theory. I reply that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids these objections and has some further virtues.
"Optimism about Moral Responsibility," Philosophers' Imprint 20, no. 33 (2020): 1-17.
Optimists about moral responsibility believe that our moral responsibility practices are justified by their beneficial consequences. Although historically prominent versions of optimism face serious challenges, I argue that the position, suitably modified, provides both a plausible justification of our practices and a fruitful framework for evaluating potential reforms.
"Punishment and Disagreement in the State of Nature," Economics and Philosophy 36, no. 3 (2020): 334-354.
I analyze Hobbes's and Locke's states of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.
"Efficient Inequalities," Journal of Political Philosophy 28, no. 2 (2020): 181-198.
Scanlon has recently argued that inequalities are unjust unless they are efficient in a way that benefits everyone. I show that this view is inconsistent given only a few very weak assumptions. If inequalities are justified when they benefit everyone, then they may also be justified by their production of a sufficient number of total benefits—regardless of how these benefits are distributed.
"Social Reform in a Complex World," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2020): 103-132.
There are two major approaches to theorizing about social reform: problem solving and ideal theory. Drawing on considerations of social complexity, I argue that the former is unsatisfactory and the latter infeasible. I then defend a new sort of theorizing that focuses on how to make institutions more "progressive": better at getting better, or more conducive to further improvements in general.
“Is Maximin Egalitarian?” Synthese 197, no. 2 (2020): 818-837.
According to the Maximin criterion of justice, one society is more just than another if the worst off member in the first society is better off than the worst off member in the second. Maximin is often interpreted as a highly egalitarian criterion that balances a concern with equality against a concern with efficiency. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken: Maximin is not an egalitarian view.
“Laws, Norms, and Public Justification: The Limits of Law as an Instrument of Reform” (with Gerald Gaus), in S. A. Langvatn, M. Kumm, & W. Sadurski (Eds.), Public Reason and Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020), 201-228.
We argue that laws are only effective at regulating behavior when they cohere with social norms, and that social norms are only stable when they align with personal moral convictions. And we employ this position to respond to a prominent objection to public reason liberalism—namely, that a commitment to the public justification of law hamstrings the pursuit of social reform.
“Interpersonal Comparisons with Preferences and Desires,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 18, no. 3 (2019): 219-241.
Many argue that interpersonal comparisons of welfare are either conceptually incoherent or hopelessly subjective, at least if one adopts the popular view that an individual's welfare consists in the satisfaction of her preferences. I agree, but argue that such comparisons are much less problematic if welfare is understood in terms of desire- rather than preference- satisfaction.
Edited Volume
Essays on Longtermism (with Hilary Greaves and David Thorstad), under contract with Oxford University Press.
A collection of essays on "longtermism": the view that positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority.
Book Reviews
Ben Laurence, Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice, Ethics (forthcoming).
A summary and review questioning Laurence's defense of the practical relevance of ideal theory.
David Estlund, Utopophobia: On The Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, Mind 131, no. 522 (2022): 691-700.
A summary and review questioning Estlund's defense of the "great value" of ideal theory.
Kevin Vallier, Must Politics be War? Restoring our Trust in the Open Society, Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 5 (2020): 567-570.
A summary and review questioning Vallier's attempt to ground public reason liberalism in the value of social trust.
Dissertation
Social Ideals and Social Reform: Political Philosophy for a Progressive Society
Committee: Gerald Gaus (Chair), Allen Buchanan, Thomas Christiano, Connie Rosati, David Schmidtz
What, if anything, does our conception of the ideally just society tell us about how we should improve our own? I argue, against most ideal theorists, that it tells us hardly anything: it provides us neither with a benchmark for evaluating nonideal societies nor with a long-term target for reform. But if the ideal can’t guide us, then should political philosophers instead engage in problem solving—identifying present instances of injustice, diagnosing their causes, and prescribing targeted solutions—as some self-described nonideal theorists have recently suggested? While problem solving has its place, I argue that it is not enough: problem solving is a good way to identify short-term improvements but not long-term ones. So how, then, should we theorize about long-term reform? I argue that we must supplement problem solving with an attempt to work out how to make our society more progressive: better at getting better, or more conducive to further improvements in general though not necessarily to the achievement of any antecedently specified goal. I offer an account of progressiveness emphasizing experimentation, learning (epistemic feedback), and selection (practical feedback). And I begin to explore some concrete ways of improving the progressiveness of existing societies.